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THE HILMER DOCTRINE,
SELF-COLLISION, NOVELTY AND THE
DEFINITION OF PRIOR ART
KATE

H. MURASHIGE

INTRODUCTION

By design, patent systems provide successful applicants with
property rights in their inventions and discoveries. Each patent system must define the nature of the rights obtained, who may obtain
them, the subject matter in which they may be obtained, and the
criteria by which these factors are determined. Currently, in all
industrialized countries, the criteria for patentability include at
least some form of the "new, useful and nonobvious" trilogy used in
the United States.
However, the application of these criteria, as well as the terms
themselves, may be different in each patent system. For example,
"nonobvious" may be referred to as "inventive," and "useful" may
be referred to as having "industrial application." Depending on
what terms are used, different patentability conclusions may be
drawn. For example, in some jurisdictions, the requirement for industrial applicability, as opposed to usefulness, appears to exclude
claims regarding methods of treating humans. Nevertheless, no jurisdiction permits property rights to be acquired and maintained in
inventions and discoveries that are not determined to be new, inventive, and useful according to some specific standards.
This Article contrasts the application of prior art in first-to-file
jurisdictions with the first-to-invent system in the United States. In
particular, this Article will defend the Hilmer doctrine as an important feature of the United States system which is designed to benefit United States inventors to the detriment of non-United States
inventors.
I.

"PRIOR ART" IS PRIOR To WHAT?

In defining "prior art," the first essential element concerns the
date from which "prior" is measured. Prior to what?
In jurisdictions using the "first-to-file" system,' protection is
1. The "first-to-file" system is used by essentially all of the industrialized
countries worldwide. The United States and the Philippines are the only jurisdictions with significant patent structures that do not use this system. The sys-
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awarded to the first inventor to file for patent protection. Therefore, the date of interest is the effective filing date. This is not necessarily the only theoretically possible date from which to measure
backwards, but it is universally applied in first-to-file jurisdictions
and is clearly the most workable.
Because of the jurisdictional nature of the rights being granted
and the existence of international treaties, such as the Paris Convention 2 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"),3 an issue
arises that involves ascertaining the "effective" filing date for the
jurisdiction in question. For members of the Paris Convention, the
effective date against which prior art generally is measured is the
Convention priority date. For example, prior art could be measured
against the application date of any foreign counterparts from which
the national application, filed within one year, claims priority.
However, this is the effective filing date with respect to prior art
generally, and is not necessarily the effective filing date to which a
grace period is applicable as is further discussed below. Therefore,
absent any statutory bars and grace periods, the starting point for
prior art in a first-to-file jurisdiction is simply the effective filing
date of the national application.
In the first-to-invent system, the starting point from which
prior art is measured becomes more complicated. The United
States is the only significant industrialized jurisdiction which maintains a "first-to-invent" system. 4 Generally, the starting point is the
date of invention.5 In the United States, however, measuring prior
tern is based on the premise that the first inventor to get his/her invention into

written form, and thus disclose it to the public, deserves to receive the patent.
Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO PatentHarmonizationTreaty, 19 AIPLA Q. J. 2
(1991).
2. See ParisConvention for the Protection of IndustrialProperty, WIPO,

art. 13(2)(a), Doc. 274(E) (1992). Article 4 of the Paris Convention provides,
inter alia, that a patent applicant in a signatory country shall enjoy a "right of
priority" in other signatory countries for a period of one year, i.e., a right during
that year to claim priority in other countries and enjoy the benefit of a filing
date equal to the filing date of the original application, rather than the date the
claim for priority is made. Id.The United States' adherence to the Paris Con-

vention is reflected in 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988). For a discussion of the Paris Convention at work in the United States, see Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d
880 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

3. June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. 8733. The PCT provides an international filing, searching, and examination procedure for applicants from member countries. The results of such examinations are not binding and eventually
the application must be filed individually in the member countries.
4. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has used the
first-to-invent system for the past 150 years. Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-file:
Is American Adoption of the InternationalStandardin PatentLaw Worth the
Price?,18 AIPLA Q. J. 193, 195 (1990). The Philippines is the only other coun-

try to use a first-to-invent system. Id. at 196 n.10; see also supra note 1.

5. The date of invention is a hazy concept at best. Fiers v. Sugano, 984 F.2d

1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
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art backwards from the effective filing date is more usefully viewed
as being related to statutory bars or grace periods as opposed to defining actual "prior art."
In the United States, sections 102 and 103 of Title 35 of the
United States Code define prior art.6 In section 102, subsections (a),
(e), and (g) define what constitutes the situation at the time the
invention is made. 7 The remaining subsections of section 102 do not
directly pertain to what constitutes prior art. Section 102(f) is simply intended to assure that only the inventor can obtain protection
for the invention. While sections 102(b), (c), and (d) assume that
the inventorship is correct, the subsections proscribe certain activities or define events prior to the filing of an application which
would defeat patentability. Furthermore, section 102(b) includes
activities of others prior to the filing of the application by the inventor.
This level of complexity is not found in first-to-file
jurisdictions.
Thus, "prior" in the term "prior art" refers to the time period
before the effective filing date of the application in first-to-file jurisdictions. In a first-to-invent jurisdiction, however, "prior" refers to
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1988). Section 102 relates to novelty; section 103
concerns nonobvious use.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 102 reads as follows:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent a person
shall be entitled to a patent unless
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States,
or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the
subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for
patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate
filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the
United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by
the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another who
has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section
371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,
or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In
determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention,
but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to
reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
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the time period preceding the moment when the invention was
"made."
II.

GRACE PERIOD VERSUS STATUTORY BAR

Notwithstanding the use of the effective filing date in first-tofile jurisdictions as the measurement date for prior art, some firstto-file jurisdictions provide grace periods for filing an application
after various forms of public disclosure have been filed regarding
the subject invention. Although there is no grace period in the European Patent Office ("EPO"),9 Canada provides a one year grace
period requiring no particular procedural formalities. 10 Article 30
of the Japanese patent statute provides a six month grace period
which requires concomitant notification of the disclosure for which
the grace period is claimed at the time of filing with a "gansho" or
petition requesting the grace period."
Grace periods in Canada and Japan are calculated from the actual national filing dates within those countries.' 2 A priority application in another jurisdiction or a PCT application which fails to
designate Canada or Japan will not do. Furthermore, the grace period applies to disclosures made either by the applicant himself or
by another if derived from the applicant. It is impossible to overcome an independent third party's disclosure of the same subject
matter by use of a grace period.
This is in contrast to the statutory bar in the United States as
provided in section 102(b). Section 102(b) requires that a United
States or PCT application designating the United States be on file
within one year of the granting of a patent, or within one year of a
description in a printed publication anywhere, or within one year of
the first public use or sale in the United States.' 3 The date from
which the bar is calculated is a national filing in the United States
or a PCT application designating the United States. However, publications of independent inventors can be overcome under section
1.131 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations' 4 by evidence
8. The word "made" is itself a term of art. Its meaning differs depending

on whether the invention was made in the United States or abroad.

9. The EPO is a regional system for examination of patent applications for
almost all of Western Europe. A European patent, once granted, must then be
converted into a "bundle" of national patents in order to become enforceable.
10. PatentAct, R.S.C. 203, s.29 (1990).
11. Tetsu Tanabe & Harold C. Wegner, JapanesePatentLaw, AIPPI JAPAN
(1979).
12. A PCT application designating Canada or Japan can also be used to calculate the grace period.
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
14. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1991). Section 1.131 provides that:
(a) When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is
rejected on reference to a domestic patent which substantially shows or
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showing prior invention by the inventor/applicant. The entire inventive entity must provide this evidence and that evidence must
relate to activities within the United States.' 5 This is a derivative of
a first-to-invent system. A statutory bar, as opposed to a grace period, makes more sense in such a system, while the logic of a strict
grace period is more appropriate to a first-to-file system.
III.

UNIVERSAL VERSUS LoCAL NOVELTY

Another distinction which can be made between systems is
based on the geographical location of the disclosure. In general,
with respect to public prior art, the European patent system is
based on an absolute novelty standard that is geographically neutral. Under this standard, novelty is defeated by any type of disclosure not protected by confidentiality anywhere in the world prior to
the effective date of application. Other jurisdictions, such as the
United States and Japan, have "mixed" standards.
As set forth above, the United States, in section 102(b), recognizes patents or printed publications anywhere in the world as a bar
to the date of application in the United States. However, section
102(b) only recognizes public use or sale within the United States.
The same is true of section 102(a) which recognizes printed publications prior to the invention date anywhere, but only recognizes
knowledge or use by others in the United States prior to the invention date.
Of course this is also a part of section 102(g), which provides
the basic notion that the patent will be awarded to the first-to-indescribes but does not claim the same patentable invention, as defined in
section 1.601(n), as the rejected invention, or on reference to a foreign patent or to a printed publication, and the inventor of the subject matter of the
rejected claim, the owner of the patent under reexamination, or the person

qualified under sections 1.42, 1.43 or 1.47, shall make oath or declaration as
to facts showing a completion of the invention in this country before the
filing date of the application on which the domestic patent issued, or before
the date of the foreign patent, or before the date of the printed publication,
then the patent or publication cited shall not bar the grant of a patent to
the inventor or the confirmation of the patentability of the claims of the
patent, unless the date of such patent or printed publication is more than
one year prior to the date on which the inventor's or patent owner's application was filed in this country.

(b) The showing of facts shall be such, in character and weight, as to
establish reduction to practice prior to the effective date of the reference,
or conception of the invention prior to the effective date of the reference
coupled with due diligence from prior to said date to a subsequent reduction to practice or to the filing of the application. Original exhibits of draw-

ings or records, or photocopies thereof, must accompany and form part of
the affidavit or declaration of their absence satisfactorily explained.

37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1991).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
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vent in the United States.1 6 While section 102(g) recognizes priority
applications under the Paris Convention as effective dates of invention (provided they meet the requirements of disclosure in section
112),17 they can serve only as a "naked" date in view of section 104.
Section 104 provides that the applicant or patentee "may not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or
other activity with respect thereto, in a foreign country, except as
provided in sections 119 and 365 of this title." i8 Thus, if, for example, the priority application was found adequate only as a conception record, diligence toward reduction to practice could not be
established if it were conducted outside of the United States.1 9 It is
substantially ineffective simply to introduce conception records of
inventions reduced to practice abroad into the United States without providing some proof of diligence between conception 20 and ac21
tual or constructive reduction to practice inside the United States.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (stating that, not only should the dates of conception
and reduction to practice be considered in determining patentability, but also
the reasonable diligence of the one who was first to conceive but last to reduce
the invention to practice).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) reads in pertinent part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 119, 365 (1988). Section 119 pertains to Convention priority
applications, while section 365 pertains to conversion of PCT applications into
United States filings.
19. The "United States" is defined as "the United States of America, its
territories and possessions." 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (1988).
20. A date of conception can be established in the United States as of the
date that an enabling disclosure enters the United States; it appears that while
it is effective to have the disclosure read and understood by a corroborating
witness, it has been held sufficient that the disclosure merely go into secure
files. Clevenger v. Kooi, 190 U.S.P.Q. 188 (BNA 1974). However, diligence toward reduction to practice must be established by acts performed within the
United States, which can include, for example, preparing claimed compounds or
preparing the patent application. Kondo v. Martel, 220 U.S.P.Q. 47 (BNA 1983).
Simply introducing into the United States evidence of proof of acts conducted
abroad is insufficient. Id. Indeed, in Kondo it was held insufficient to submit a
claimed compound (an actual reduction to practice) with a drawing of its structure and a boiling point. Id. The Board distinguished Breuer v. DeMarinis, 558
F.2d 22 (Fed. Cir. 1977), where the compound was accompanied by an IR spectrum. Id. Importation of the product of a patented process in the United States
does not serve as reduction to practice of the process when the process was practiced abroad. Shurie v. Richmond, 699 F.2d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
21. The filing of a patent application that meets the requirements of the
first paragragh of section 112 constitutes constructive reduction to practice. See
supra note 17 for the complete text of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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22
The geographic distinction is also relevant to section 102(e).
Similarly, the provisions of the Japanese statute defining prior
art make a distinction between publications and public knowledge
or use. 23 Publications are effective regardless of where they appear,
while public knowledge or public working must be shown in Japan.

IV.

NOVELTY VERSUS INVENTIVE STEP

Most patent statutes also make a distinction between prior art
which is available to defeat novelty and prior art which may be applied with respect to the "inventive step" criterion. In general, the
rule is that prior art that is available to the public as of its effective
date can be used with respect to both criteria. Prior art that is
somehow sequestered at its effective date, is applicable only with
respect to novelty. However, there is one exception in the United
24
States, namely section 102(e).
The only prior art not available to the public as of its effective
date is the patent literature. In general, when a patent application
is published 25 it becomes effective prior art with respect to both
novelty and inventive step as of its publication date. However, it is
also effective as prior art, at least with regard to novelty, as of its
filing date with respect to patent applicants in the same jurisdictions in which it had been filed. In most cases, for example in Europe and Japan, this earlier filing date is effective only with respect
to novelty. In the United States, however, nonobviousness is also
included in the inquiry.
Considerable controversy exists over the use of nonpublic prior
art to defeat patentability on the basis of obviousness or lack of inventive step. The problem is complicated, even with respect to published prior art, in that the standards for what is considered obvious
or noninventive vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and are subjective at best within any jurisdiction. While the United States is
said to use an "objective" test, inherent in the word "obvious" is a
subjective standard.26 For example, whether an invention would be
22. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying pages for a discussion of section

102(e) and its limitations to patent applications filed "in the United States."
23. Tanabe & Wegner, supra note 11; JAPANESE PATENT LAW, art. 29, para.
1, items 1-3 (1988).
24. Section 102(e) states that "a person shall be entitled to a patent unless
the invention was described in apatent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent." 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).

Under section 102(e), the issued U.S. patent

becomes available as a reference when it issues, but its effective date is that of
its filing in the United States.
25. Presently in the United States, a patent application is published only

through issuance.
26. The factual inquiries under the obviousness standard are: (1) what differences exist between the invention and the state of the art at the time the
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obvious to one skilled in the art is inevitably a subjective determination based on factual inquiries.
The European approach to inventive step generally uses a
"problem and solution" analysis. The determination, for example,
would rest on whether the claimed solution to a particular problem
is inventive. 27 Thus, the application of certain prior art with respect only to novelty has a certain appeal. In the United States,
prior art under section 102(f) or 102(g) is only available with respect
to novelty and is specifically exempted from section 103 by a 1984
amendment. 2s A similar provision was not made with respect to
the non-public art of section 102(e) which has additional problems
29
commonly referred to as "the Hilmer doctrine."
An additional issue with respect to the impact of earlier filed,
but unpublished applications, arises in the context of "self-collision." This issue relates to whether an earlier filed, but unpublished application by the same inventor, is or is not considered prior
art with respect to a later application to the same or similar subject
matter. At one extreme is the proposal that earlier applications by
the same inventor simply do not constitute prior art. The consequence of such a rule is the possibility of what is described in the
United States as "double patenting. '30 This is not a serious consideration in most jurisdictions which publish applications eighteen
months or more after the priority date, since the maximum patent
term extension obtainable would be eighteen months. The effect of
double patenting, at least with respect to the same subject matter, is
invention was made; (2) the level of skill of one ordinarily skilled in the art; and
(3) whether the differences would, at the time the invention was made, have
been obvious to this person of ordinary skill. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1
(1954). While testimony could certainly be adduced with respect to the third
criterion, in reality, this will almost always be a subjective judgment. It has also
been generally held that "secondary considerations" such as commercial success, which actually can be objective, should always be considered.
27. It is unclear whether it would ever be possible to enunciate a truly objective standard of obviousness or inventive step. It should be noted that "secondary considerations" can only go to show nonobviousness; under currently
accepted philosophies underlying patent systems, "secondary considerations"
could not be applied to show that an invention was obvious.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 103 provides:
Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art
not only under subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not
preclude patentability under this section where the subject matter and the
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the
same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
This section was amended to remedy the problems created by the holding
in In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
29. See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Hilmer doctrine.
30. "Double patenting" describes the situation where two applications made
to a claim amount to the same invention or an obvious variation of it.
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avoided in the United States by requiring that the subject matter be
"new" under section 101.31

Alternative proposals regarding self-collision include those
wherein an applicant would have a specified time limit to file continuing applications and claim the priority of the first application in
32
jurisdictions that do not have this practice.
V.

THE HILMER DOCTRINE

United States patent practitioners are very familiar with the
"Hilmer doctrine. 3 3s In its most straightforward form, the Hilmer
doctrine stands for the proposition that the disclosure of an issued
patent in the United States is available as prior art under section
102(e) against other United States applicants as of its filing date as a
United States national application.34 Its effective date as prior art is
not its "priority date" based on a foreign national application, nor is
it the filing date of an international PCT application from which
35
priority is claimed, even if the United States is designated.
The first portion of the foregoing sentence is a result of the
holding of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in Hilmer I,3 the second is an explicit statement in the statute. In
enacting the requisite statutory provisions to establish the effect of
international PCT applications, this aspect of the holding in Hilmer
I was codified in sections 363 and 375(a) of Title 35 in the United
States Code. 37 The fate of section 102(e) and its interpretation in
the Hilmer cases is a subject of considerable controversy under any
harmonization proposal. A review of the origins of the Hilmer doc31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
32. See generally Pagenberg, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the self-collision
rule and proposals regarding the time limit to file supplementary applications).
33. The "Hilmer doctrine" was established in In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859
(C.C.P.A. 1966) (Hilmer 1) and was discussed further in In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d
1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Hilmer II).
34. Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 879.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 861.
37. Section 363 provides:
An international application designating the United States shall have the
effect, from its international filing date under Article 11 of the treaty, of a
national application for patent regularly filed in the PTO except as otherwise provided in section 102(e) of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
Section 375(a) provides:
A patent may be issued by the Commissioner based on an international
application designating the United States, in accordance with the provisions
of this title, subject to section 102(e) of this title, such patent shall have the
force and effect of a patent issued on a national application filed under the
provisions of chapter 11 of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 375(a) (1988).
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trine will show why this section of the statute receives so much
attention.
Hilmer I contains an extensive discussion of the reasoning applied in reaching the conclusion that an issued United States patent
is a prior art reference only as of its filing date in the United States
and not as of the date of any Convention document from which priority is claimed. Hilmer II extends this doctrine to application of
section 102(g) under circumstances where there is no decision as to
priority with respect to contested interfering subject matter.
The Hilmer cases arose from two series of relatively contemporaneous applications, each based on a non-United States priority
document. The timelines are shown diagrammatically as follows:
Habicht (Swiss)
1/24/57
1Hilmer
Habicht (U.S.)
1/23/58

(German)
7/31/57

1

Hilmer (U.S.)
7/25/58
Habicht had prevailed in an interference proceeding in the PTO to
determine who was first to invent with respect to the subject matter
of a count 38 to which Habicht's claim 1 corresponded and which covered compounds of the formula:
(CH 3 -

-

SO2NHCONHCH 2S)2,

i.e., containing an aromaticring system. Hilmer conceded priority
with respect to this subject matter, so Habicht prevailed in the interference proceeding as to this invention.
The claims at issue in the Hilmer cases did not correspond to
the count in interference and were directed to compounds of the
formula:
-

SO 2NHCONHCH 2CH2 S) 2 .

i.e., containing a saturated ring system. Habicht did not disclose
these compounds. The sole difference between the subject matter
for which priority has been settled and that for which it has not was
the nature of the ring system as saturated or aromatic.
38. A "count" defines the subject matter of an interference proceeding. It is
with respect to the subject matter of the count that priority of invention is de-

termined. Claims "corresponding" to the count are deemed to cover subject

matter that is patentably indistinct from the subject matter of the count. The
count and claims corresponding to it need not be absolutely identical.
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The subject matter of the interference was readily resolved as
both parties were accorded priority of their earlier-filed applications in Switzerland or Germany. Additionally, priority as to that
subject matter was conceded by Hilmer.39 However, the claims as
to the compounds with saturated ring systems in Hilmer (and not
disclosed by Habicht) were not considered to correspond to the
count and were thus examined by the PTO independent of the interference proceeding.
Claims directed to this exclusively Hilmer subject matter were
rejected over the combination of the Habicht disclosure of the
above compounds containing aromatic rings along with an additional secondary reference. Because Habicht was issued a United
States patent, the patent was available as a reference as of its effective filing date under section 102(e). There was no dispute that
Hilmer was to be accorded priority to its German application in accordance with section 119.40
Thus, the sole issue became whether disclosure of the analogous aromatic compounds by Habicht could be used as a reference
under section 102(e) only as of Habicht's United States filing date
(which would not defeat Hilmer's claims), or whether it was effective as prior art as of Habicht's Swiss priority date (which would
41
defeat Hilmer's claims).
With respect to the effective date as prior art under section
102(e), there had, at the time of Hilmer I, evidently been a recent
change of the position taken on this matter by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Several PTO Board decisions had been rendered and a notice in the PTO Official Gazette
("OG") was published, and was apparently intended to alter a
number of years of PTO practice on this point. Hilmer I refers to a
Commissioner of Patents notice published in the June 9, 1964, OG,
which stated:
[R]evoking a very long-standing section of the Manual of Patent Procedure (MPEP), 715.01 "Reference Claims Foreign Filing Date," based
on a Commissioner's decision of May 9, 1935, Viviani v. Taylor v.
39. Since both parties were foreign applicants and, as discussed above, only
activities within the United States are considered with regard to establishing
conception and diligence to reduction to practice, the earliest possible date on
which either party could rely was the filing date of the non-United States application from which priority was claimed.
40. See text accompanying note 49 infra for the relevant parts of 35 U.S.C.
§ 119.
41. Hilmer II dealt with perhaps a more subtle issue: Whether Habicht's
establishment of prior invention of the aromatic compounds made the disclosure a reference under section 102(g) as of the Swiss filing date. The answer
was no, but the decision is now probably moot in view of the 1984 amendment to
section 103. See supra note 28 for the text of the 1984 amendment to section
103. Had the issue been anticipation rather than obviousness, the decision in
the interference would have been determinative.
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Herzog, 72 USPQ 448, and providing that an applicant need not antedate the foreign filing date of a reference. The Notice stated that "foreign filing date is considered the effective date in those situations
where claimed subject matter of the domestic patent (or disclosed matter related thereto) is being used as the basis for rejection, and where
no question of interference exists." 42
The logic behind this notice evidently resided in the wording of
section 119, which states in pertinent part:
an application for a patent for the same invention in a foreign [convention] country... shall have the same effect as the same application
would have if filed in this country... if the application in this country
is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such for43
eign application was filed ....
The Board in the Hilmer decision, consistent with the notice in
the OG, simply interpreted section 119 as standing for the proposition that the patent must be given the same prior art effect under
section 102(e) as an application filed in the PTO.
The court reversed the Board's decision on the basis that to interpret "the same effect" was broader than the clear intention of
Congress in enacting the statute.44 The court said that "the same
effect" simply meant the applicant would be accorded the filing
date of the foreign application for purposes of priorityof invention
45
and with respect to subsequent publications.
In ascertaining the statute's intent, the court quoted from the
report of a commission created by Congress in 1898 to study the
effect of the Paris Convention, in connection with the predecessor
statute to section 119.46 The commission noted that the purpose of
the Paris Convention was to allow applications in one member
country to delay application in other member countries for the convention period and still remain unaffected by intervening publications. 47
This is of critical importance in jurisdictions where
absolute novelty is the standard. The court in Hilmer I concluded
that this is all that was meant by "the same effect."
Section 119 itself makes an exception to a more sweeping interpretation of "the same effect" by specifically requiring the filing of
a national application in the United States to avoid the statutory bar
of section 102(b). 48 After stating that the foreign filing shall have
"the same effect," section 119 goes on to state:
42. Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 865.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

35 U.S.C. § 119.
Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 872-76.
Id. at 876.
Id at 872.
Id. at 873.

48. See supra note 7 for the complete text of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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[Blut no patent shall be granted on any application for patent for an
invention which had been patented or described in a printed publication in any country more than one year before the date of the actual
filing of the application in this country, or which had been in public49use
or on sale in this country more than one year prior to such filing.
Thus, having concluded that this exception shows that "same
effect" does not mean precisely what it states, the court in Hilmer I
reasoned that the words should be limited to what the section of the
statute was clearly intended to do, namely allowing the applicant to
avoid intervening publications between the foreign Convention application date and the filing date of the United States application.
In specifically discussing section 102(e), the court first asserted
that section 102(e) is an essentially different type of statutory provision from section 119. The court stated that section 119 gives affirmative priority rights to applicants, whereas 102(e) is a
"negative" provision which defeats applicants. 5 0 The court further
stated that section 102(e) is a codification of the Supreme Court de51
cision in Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville CO.
However, the court in Hilmer I distinguished Milburn because
there was no foreign application involved. The court pointed out
that the United States Supreme Court in Milburn simply held that
the disclosure by another in an issued patent was effective as of its
filing date in the United States as a reference against other applicants.5 2 Then, citing the difficulties created by "secret" prior art, as
is the nature of section 102(e) references, the Hilmer I court stated
that Milburn and its progeny had "gone far enough" in the direction of allowing applicability of such secret prior art by permitting
its effective date as prior art to correspond to the United States filing date. 53 Summarizing, the court stated as follows:
[Tihe prohibitions of 104, the limitations in sections 102(a) and 102(g)
to 'in this country,' and the specifying in 102(e) of an application filed
'in the United States' clearly demonstrates a policy in our patent statutes to the effect that knowledge and acts in a foreign country are not
to defeat the rights. of applicants for patents,
except as applicants may
54
become involved in priority disputes.
Following a lengthy and circuitous argument that its earlier holding
in In re Walker 55 was being followed, the Hilmer I court based its
decision largely on this policy consideration.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 119.
50. Hilmer 1, 359 F.2d at 876.
51. 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
52. Milburn, 270 U.S. at 401. It was also made clear by the Court in Milburn that no particular distinction should be made between the claimed subject
matter and the subject matter of the disclosure. Id
53. Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 877.
54. Id. at 878.
55. 213 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (emphasis added).
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In addition, the HilmerI court dismissed an analogy the Board
of Appeals had made to section 120, applicable to continuing applications based on United States filings.m Section 120 provides that
subsequent applications will have "the same effect" with respect to
dates for an invention disclosed in an earlier-filed United States application under the conditions of continuing applications. 57
In a dissent, the court criticized the majority's reliance on In re
Walker.58 According to the dissenters, Walker was based on the
adverse award of priority of invention against the appellant, not the
disclosure of an earlier-filed foreign application, although the latter
was discussed in dicta.5 9 But, it is apparent from the majority opinion that the basis for the actual holding in In re Walker was not
crystal clear.
Nevertheless, the holding in Hilmer I has been consistently followed, and the effective date for application of section 102(e) appears settled to be the filing date of the application in the PTO, and
not that of any Convention documents. This is true by virtue of
Hilmer I for national or regional applications in foreign jurisdictions. For international applications, whether or not they designate
the United States, this is codified in sections 363 and 375 of Title 35
in the United States Code.
VI.

THE EFFECT OF

35 U.S.C. § 102(e)

IN RELATED INVENTIONS

The fixation in United States patent law in making only "the
inventor" the applicant and in adhering strictly to priority of invention to decide patent entitlement, creates a number of problems
when research is done in the context of a large organization. Even
more serious are the problems that arise when research is done in
the context of cooperation between two or more organizations. As
such research projects develop, it is possible to identify various potential patent claims having different inventive entities, though resulting from a common effort and having at least some community
of interest in their ownership. In first-to-file jurisdictions, the invention, for purposes of property rights, does not exist at all until
an application is filed. In contrast, in first-to-invent jurisdictions an
unexamined or carelessly monitored sequence of events can impair
the validity of, or possibly prevent the issuance of, claims which
would otherwise be patentable.
56. Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 879.

57. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1988). Section 120 now also references earlier applications filed under section 363, concerning effect on the national phase of a PCT
application, but specifically excepts the inclusion of the effect of such PCT application under section 102(e).
58. Hilmer I, 359 F.2d at 884.
59. Id.
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The provisions of section 102 related to date of invention all
permit the use of various procedures to obviate prior art, which is
cited with respect to the date of application. References cited under
section 102(a) or (e) can be overcome if: (1) the referenced activity
or publication can be predated by a priority application entitled to
the benefit of section 119; or (2) activities showing invention in the
United States prior to the effective date of the reference can be
shown pursuant to a declaration under section 1.13160; or (3) the

publication or disclosure can be shown to be the work of the applicant inventive entity. 61 Section 102(g) interference proceedings are
also available. In instituting these proceedings, it is not necessary to
formally overcome a rejection under section 102(e) prior to the institution of an interference. In the event that the United States
replaces its first-to-invent system with a first-to-file system, presumably section 102(a) would be modified so that the application for
invention by the applicant, whether it be in the United States or a
convention application, would be the reference point. Thus, section
102(g) would appear unnecessary since only the filing of an application would evidence the making of an invention.
Prior art cited only under section 102(f) or (g) is excepted from
the requirement for nonobviousness in section 103. At least with
respect to research conducted under the auspices of a single organization, the problems caused by the first-to-invent system as exemplified in In re Bass 62 are largely obviated. As a result, cooperative
research among various potential assignees is disadvantaged in relation to research conducted solely for the benefit of a single institution. This has made the assignability of inventions in the context of
cooperative research programs an issue.
The amendment to section 103 excepting section 102(f) and (g)
did not include prior art under section 102(e), thus creating a trap
for the unwary. Clearly, applications to similar subject matter cannot safely be filed on different dates by the same assignee unless
the inventive entities are exactly identical. This has necessitated
the filing of continuations-in-part, along with abandonment of ini60. See supra note 14 for the text of 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1991).
61. It frequently happens that the authorship of a publication and the inventive entity on a patent application are not absolutely identical. It has been
held that since the criteria for coauthorship and for status as an inventor are
not identical, a mismatch between authors of a publication and the inventive
entity does not itself raise a presumption that the invention described in the
publication is not properly ascribed to the stated inventive entity. However, it
may be necessary to submit a "Katz" declaration establishing that additional
coauthors, for example, merely conducted work under the direction of the
named inventors. In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
62. 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The ruling in In re Bass led to the
amendment of section 103 to remove sections 102(f) and (g) prior art from consideration under an obviousness standard when both the prior and considered
inventions are commonly assigned. Id
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tially filed cases, whenever the inventorship entity changes. The
earlier applications cannot be allowed to issue as patents without
becoming section 102(e) references with respect to the subsequent
applications containing modifications or improvements.
VII.

THE FATE OF SECTION 102(e) UNDER HARMONIZATION

Assuming the United States adopts a first-to-file system, section 102(e) would have to be modified so that the date of invention
is replaced by the date of application. However, this simple change
would not necessarily change the Hilmer doctrine as it applies to
nonobviousness. Unless the statute were further amended, the
prior art effect of competing applications under current section 103
would still be restricted to their United States filing dates. The rationale for much of the holding in Hilmer I fails in any attempt to
harmonize world patent protection. Inherent in any attempts at
harmonization is the discarding of provisions which unduly favor
the nationals of a particular jurisdiction. Therefore, some revision
of the statute is clearly in order.
There are a number of options. Most proposals require that, in
order for the application to be used as a reference, the application
must be published or issued before it can be applied at all. There
appears to be no serious argument about this point. However, there
might be if publication continues to require issuance in the United
States. An earlier-issued patent might be automatically invalidated
by a later-issued one, for the reasons explained below. The effect of
publication can be divided with respect to anticipation and obviousness and a number of possible effective dates could be considered. Possible effective dates are summarized in the chart below.
Possibilitiesfor Restructuring the Hilmer Doctrine Under a Firstto-File System
Date of Effectiveness
as Prior Art Once
Published or Issued
Publication/Issue
Filing Date in United States
PCT designating United States
Non-United States convention

Novelty
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Nonobviousness
Yes
Yes/No
Yes/No
Yes/No

As seen in the above chart, the reference must be effective with
respect to its claims as of its filing date in the United States and
with respect to any convention application with respect to novelty
since this is a first-to-file system. The first-to-file automatically
succeeds unless multiple patents to the same subject matter are permitted. Nonobviousness is another matter. If the Hilmer doctrine
were to be retained, only the United States filing date would count.
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The Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform recommended
that if the United States maintains a first-to-invent system, the
Hilmer doctrine should be maintained as is,63 regardless of whether
publication of applications is adopted. Either issuance or publication, whichever occurs first, would trigger consideration. However,
if first-to-file is adopted in the United States, the proposal of the
Commission is that the effective date as a reference with respect to
novelty would be the foreign or domestic priority date-as it must
be with respect to claimed subject matter--and for obviousness the
United States filing date would remain. This would not be exactly
harmonious with practices elsewhere and represents essentially no
change from Hilmer. In the foregoing chart, only the botton two
"no" options are chosen.
Practices in the European Patent Convention and in Japan are
similar. The European Convention, in Article 89, explicitly recognizes the effectiveness of a Convention priority document as an effective filing both for priority and as prior art. This Article
explicitly states that the "effective filing date" is that of the priority
application with respect to Article 54, paragraph 2 which specifies
the date against which the existent prior art is judged; Article 54,
paragraph 3 which describes the prior art effect of other European
applications; and with respect to Article 60(2), which assures right
of protection to the first inventor to file. The "whole contents" of
European applications are available as prior art. However, unpublished applications are considered prior art only with respect to a
novelty standard, and do not have an impact on inventive step (Article 56). Therefore, in the foregoing chart, all of the "no" options
are chosen.
The same is true under Japanese Patent Law. Rights under
the Paris Convention are attributable to priority applications both
for the purpose of filing date priority and also with respect to prior
art effect. Japanese applications become available as references
upon publication; their effective dates with respect to obviousness
or "easy to make" is the publication date; the effective dates with
respect to anticipation are effective filing dates, which necessarily
includes the priority application."
SUMMARY

The combination of the Paris Convention with the first-to-file
system necessarily leads to the consideration of claims in earlierfiled applications. Once applications are published they become
prior art as to novelty as of their earliest priority date. While it is
63. Harry F. Manbeck et al., AIPLA Selected Legal PapersX3-20 (1993).
64. Tanabe & Wegner, supra note 11.

566

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:549

not necessary to require publication before these applications can
be considered, there seems to be no sentiment that this should not
be the case. Awkward situations will arise if applications continue
to be published only on issuance in the United States. Replacing a
first-to-invent system with a first-to-file system necessarily removes
one arm of the Hilmer doctrine. Most jurisdictions world-wide
treat non-published prior art, such as unpublished pending applications in the same jurisdiction, as a reference only for novelty, not
with respect to nonobviousness. The Hilmer doctrine assumes that
section 103 includes reference to all provisions of section 102.
Therefore, without a statutory change a discrepancy, with respect
to priority and to value as a reference, would be maintained between applications filed in the United States and applications filed
abroad.

